Content Externalism, Metaphysical Realism, and Truth

Michael Horton and Kamper Floyd (University of Kentucky)

Presented to the Mississippi Philosophical Association 2007 Meeting

Abstract

Goldberg [under review] notes that many of the core arguments for content externalism assume some version of metaphysical realism. Furthermore, when some of the standard versions of metaphysical realism are combined with content externalism, we get untoward implications regarding the in principle knowability of thought-contents, namely, that it then becomes in principle possible to have a thought with a determinate thought-content but yet never be in a position to know that one is having a thought with that content. In other words, “how we represent the world’s joints in thought could be more fine-grained than anything we humans could discern” (13, emphasis in original). Goldberg points out that such a conclusion may be fine so far as the extra-mental world is concerned, but that with respect to the mental world, “this can’t be right” (20, emphasis in original).

Goldberg's argument is compelling.  But, the implications of combining content externalism with metaphysical realism are not as unruly as Goldberg suggests.  Most versions of metaphysical realism presuppose a robust correspondence theory of truth.  Goldberg takes this for granted.  It is possible, however, to be a metaphysical realist without adhering to a robust correspondence theory of truth.  In this paper, we explore this possibility and show its implications for Goldberg's argument.  Read in light of our argument, Goldberg's position gives less reason, not more, to worry about skepticism about knowledge of mental states.