Currently I’m working on my dissertation in philosophy at the University of Kentucky under the direction of Brandon Look.  Additionally, I’m working on a few papers and collaborations.  Most recent work is listed below.  Offprints available upon request. 

Presented at the Alabama Philosophical Society’s 45th Annual Conference September 21-22, 2007.

Abstract (.doc) or Abstract (.html)

Dissertation—in progress.  I expect to be done in Summer 2010.  In it I argue that truth-conditional semantics requires a more robust conception of truth than deflationary and minimalist conceptions provide.  I go on to provide such a conception.

Coauthored with Kamper Floyd (USM).  Presented at the Mississippi Philosophical Association’s April 13-14, 2007 Meeting. 

Abstract (.doc) or Abstract (.html)

 

“Alethic Functionalism and Meaning” (.doc)

Inflationary Truth-Theoretic Semantics

“Content Externalism, Metaphysical Realism and Truth”         

Project List

“Alethic Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Reduction” (Acta Analytica, forthcoming)

Coauthored with Ted Poston (USA).  We argue that alethic functionalism faces the same challenge Jaegwon Kim (1992) laid out for the multiple realization thesis in the philosophy of mind.  We will show that on Lynch’s view truth turns out to be a wildly heterogeneous, nonnomic kind or that ‘truth’ does not pick out a kind at all.

“Alethic Functionalism and the Unity of Semantics”

Presented at PHLing, Northwestern University’s Philosophy and Linguistics Workgroup, December 12, 2008.  Abstract here.  [N.B.  The impetus for this paper was Poston and Horton’s APS 2008 Presentation (see below).  Here I go beyond that paper in substantial ways.]

“Multiple Realizability about Truth:  Uninterpretable Languages?”

Presented at the April 17-18, 2009 meeting of the Midsouth Philosophy Conference (U. of Memphis).  Abstract:  In this paper I present a consequence of combining the view that truth is a multiply realizable property with a view about interpretation.  I will show that when combined with a not uncommon understanding of semantics, as providing a theory knowledge of which suffices for interpretation of sentences (or utterances) of a target language, the view that truth is multiply realizable and non-reducible, together with other assumptions, has the consequence that there exist metaphysically possible but uninterpretable languages.